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HOFSTPA lAW REVIEW
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ESSAY
ENFORCEMENT OF WTO RULINGS: AN INTEREST
GROUP ANALYSIS
Mark L. Movsesian*
Of all the many changes that the WTO has made in the international
trading system, none has drawn more attention than the mechanism it
has established for settling disputes between member states. 1 The
WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") provides that
disputes are to be resolved in adversarial proceedings before impartial
panels of experts.2 These panels have authority to decide whether
members' laws conform to WTO requirements; members may appeal
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. I would like to thank Steve
Chamovitz, the late Robert Hudec, and John McGinnis for thoughtful readings of earlier drafts; the
participants in workshops at Notre Dame and the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the
University of London for helpful comments; and Connie Lenz and Lisa Spar of the Deane Law
Library at Hofstra for research assistance.
1. See, e.g., David Palmeter, The WTO As a Legal System, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 444,468
(2000) (characterizing WTO dispute settlement system as "perhaps the most significant
achievement of the Uruguay Round negotiations" that established the WTO); cf William J. Davey,
Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its Authority?, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L 79, 79 (2001)
(noting that the dispute settlement mechanism "has attracted a great deal of attention" from WTO
members and the general public alike). There is a voluminous literature on WTO dispute settlement.
See Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World Trade Organization: Lessons
From the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 775, 777 n.8 (1999) (collecting
sources).
2. WTO Secretariat, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES, arts. 6-16, 19 (2d ed. 2001)
[hereinafter DSU]. For a detailed description of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, see
DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1999).
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rulings to a permanent Appellate Body within the organization, which
has the final say on questions of law and legal interpretation.3 In a major
departure from past practice, the new procedures include a strengthened
enforcement mechanism. 4 Under the DSU, if a member fails to comply
with a final ruling in a dispute, the prevailing party may retaliate by
suspending trade concessions that it owes the offending member.5 This
retaliation can continue until the offending member implements the
WTO's decision, for example, by changing its laws. 6
Judging by the frequency with which members resort to it, the new
mechanism is a stunning success.7 In the eight years since the
organization was established, members have filed nearly 300 disputes
with the WTO.8 Most of these have been resolved before reaching the
enforcement stage, but the WTO has authorized retaliation in seven
disputes,9 three of them high-profile controversies between the United
States and the European Communities. 10 Still, WTO dispute settlement
has drawn great criticism, much of it focusing on the new enforcement
mechanism." Several commentators argue that the retaliation remedy is
too weak and unpredictable to be of any real use, 12 particularly in
3. See DSU, supra note 2, arts. 17-19.
4. See, e.g., Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between
Governments: A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 79,
84-86 (1998) (discussing legalistic reforms in the Uruguay Round); Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 488
(1994) (discussing strengthening of dispute settlement procedures in the Uruguay Round); cf
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 153 (WTO dispute settlement "is, in all probability, the
most effective area of adjudicative dispute settlement in ... public international law"). For a
description of past practice, see id. at 7-11.
5. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22.
6. See Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 487.
7. See James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 248, 250 (2001).
8. WTO Secretariat, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/14, ii (June 30,
2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispue.htm [hereinafter Update]
(statistical overview showing 295 complaints notified to the WTO since January 1, 1995). This
number is much greater than the number of disputes heard in the entire history of the old GATT
system. See Cameron & Gray, supra note 7, at 250 n.15.
9. See Update, supra note 8, at ii.
10. See Update, supra note 8, at 128 (discussing Hormones dispute), 129 (discussing Bananas
dispute), 141 (discussing Foreign Sales Corporations dispute).
11. See Mark Clough, The WTO Dispute Settlement System-A Practitioner Perspective, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 252, 253, 270 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Monika Bftler & Heinz Hauser, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First
Assessment from an Economic Perspective, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 503, 528 (2000); Carolyn B.
Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO Dispute Settlement Implementation Procedures: A System
in Need of Reform, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 709, 712-13, 729 (2000); Philippe Ruttley, WTO
Dispute Settlement and Private Sector Interests: A Slow, But Gradual Improvement?, in DUE
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asymmetric disputes between large and small economies. 13 These critics
advocate reforms that would make the enforcement mechanism more
rigorous, such as authorizing collective retaliation against offending
members,14 or granting WTO rules direct effect in domestic courts. 15
By contrast, other critics contend that the present enforcement
regime is too coercive and inflexible.' 6 To them, retaliation seems high
handed, an attempt to force sovereign states to repeal laws that were
enacted by democratically elected governments.' 7  Suspending trade
concessions, they point out, hurts innocent firms that find their products
subject to higher tariffs. 18 Moreover, the retaliation remedy undercuts the
WTO's own first principles by creating a situation where two
PROCESS IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 167, 173, 180-81 (Philippe Ruttley et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter Ruttley, WTO Dispute Settlement].
13. On the relative ineffectiveness of the enforcement mechanism in asymmetric disputes, see
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 473-74; Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and
Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 335, 338 (2000); Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers
Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 408 (1995); see also Arvind Subramanian &
Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the
WTO?, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 403, 403-04 (2000) (discussing developing countries' complaints); cf
John H. Jackson, Emerging Problems of the WTO Constitution. Dispute Settlement and Decision
Making in the Jurisprudence of the WTO, in LIBERALISATION AND PROTECTIONISM IN THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 25, 31 (Philip Ruttley et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that small countries that lack in-
house legal expertise are at a "substantial disadvantage against large entities like the United States
or the European Community").
14. See Pauwelyn, supra note 13, at 336, 343-45.
15. For useful discussions of direct effect in the WTO system, see, for example, Thomas
Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The Relationship Between World Trade Organization
Law, National and Regional Law, I J. INT'L ECON. L. 83, 116-22 (1998); Piet Eeckhout, The
Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement.: Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 11, 48-58 (1997); Ruttley, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 12, at 186-88; Philip
Ruttley, The Effect of WTO Agreements in EC Law, in THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REGULATION 130, 131, 154-55 (Philip Ruttley et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Ruttley, The Effect of
WTO Agreements]. For a piece advocating direct effect in regional trading arrangements, see
Frederick M. Abbott, Regional Integration Mechanisms in the Law of the United States. Starting
Over, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 155, 157-59 (1993). For a canonical discussion of direct
effect in international law generally, see John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 792,
792, 832 (2001); Edward Alden, Bad Losers Cast Gloom Over WTO's Disputes Procedure, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at 8 (discussing critics' view that enforcement mechanism has "often forced
governments into unnecessarily belligerent actions").
17. See REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ADVISORY COMMISSION
114 (2000) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT]; Movsesian, supra note 1, at 779 &
nn. 19-20 (discussing critics' views).
18. See Reinhard Quick, TABD Still Supports Trade Dispute Settlement, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2000, at 14; TRANSATLANTIC BUSINESS DIALOGUE, CINCINNATI RECOMMENDATIONS 37-38 (2000);
see also Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 810-11 (arguing that WTO sanctions hurt "innocent economic
actors" and violate the "basic human right" to "voluntary commercial intercourse").
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countries-the offending member that has enacted the protectionist
measure and the injured member that has responded with trade
sanctions-have departed from free trade commitments. 19 These critics
argue that the WTO should consider "softer" enforcement mechanisms
with fewer "teeth. 2°
In this essay, I defend the existing enforcement mechanism. I do so
by explaining the mechanism in terms of interest group theory. Even
though protectionist measures injure consumers as a whole, countries
often adopt such measures to satisfy the demands of domestic interest
groups that suffer because of free trade-for example, domestic firms
that lose market share because of import competition. 21 By imposing
burdens on the products of countries that adopt such measures, the
retaliation remedy creates incentives for another set of domestic interest
groups-exporters-to lobby against them.22 Over time, if retaliation is
correctly calibrated, the domestic groups that favor free trade can
neutralize the effect of the domestic groups that oppose it.
23
The retaliation remedy thus promotes compliance with WTO
rulings without intruding directly on domestic institutions. In this way,
the mechanism is superior to suggested reforms, like direct effect, that
would commandeer courts or other national governmental bodies.24
Indeed, the genius of the retaliation remedy lies in its ability to use the
domestic political process to achieve the public interest. By setting one
collection of interest groups against another, the retaliation remedy
19. See Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 810; Quick, supra note 18, at 14. For more on this irony,
see Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 487.
20. Chamovitz, supra note 16, at 792, 832.
21. See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 511, 521-25 (2000); see also infra text accompanying notes 37-44.
22. See Judith Goldstein, International Institutions and Domestic Politics: GA TT, WTO, and
the Liberalization ofInternational Trade, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 133,
144-45 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1998); Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO
Dispute Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 369, 389 (Friedl
Weiss ed., 2000); Daniel R. Murray, Foie Gras?: Making Economic Sense of the 1999 U.S. Tariffs
on Gourmet European Goods, 5 J. INT'L LEG. STUD. 243, 262-63, 264-68, 270 (1999); Jide Nzelibe,
The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the World Trade
Organization 's Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2004).
23. See Murray, supra note 22, at 267-68.
24. See ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 114 (arguing against direct effect
for WTO); cf Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New
Problems With Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 77 (2000) (discussing the "legitimacy deficit"
that international organizations "suffer... when attempting to acquire direct authority over the U.S.
citizenry").
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encourages the adoption of free trade policies that benefit a nation's
consumers as a whole.25
This essay proceeds as follows. First, I explain the interest group
theory of trade restrictions, showing how interest groups can secure the
adoption of protectionist measures that work to the detriment of
consumers as a whole.26 I then describe the WTO's enforcement
mechanism and demonstrate how it can overcome the problems posed by
protectionist groups and promote compliance with a nation's free trade
commitments.27 Next, I discuss the two disputes to date in which
prevailing parties have resorted to the retaliation remedy, Bananas and
Hormones.28 Finally, I show how the retaliation remedy is superior to
one suggested reform that has drawn a great deal of attention, namely,
giving WTO rulings direct effect in national courts.29
One important qualification is necessary at the outset. This essay
addresses trade restrictions that nations adopt to protect the economic
interests of domestic groups. Of course, nations may adopt a variety of
regulatory measures that have an incidental adverse impact on trade-
environmental or public health measures, for example. 30 As long as they
do not amount to pretexts for discrimination against foreign products,
these sorts of measures are generally acceptable under WTO rules.3t As
a consequence, they should not implicate the DSU's enforcement
mechanism, and I do not address them here.
25. Cf Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade
Organization, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 49, 67 (2000) (noting how bargaining among states with respect to
trade concessions allows individual governments to pit exporters against protectionists, thereby
increasing consumer welfare).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 37-44.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 45-87.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 88-110 (discussing Bananas and Hormones).
29. See infra text accompanying notes II 1-141.
30. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 480-81 (4th ed. 2002).
31. See id.; McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 2 1, at 550. For example, article XX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade allows members to adopt various regulatory measures,
such as measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health," as long as such
measures are not "a disguised restriction on international trade." General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-i1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Other
WTO instruments contain similar language. See, e.g., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 117 (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement]; Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1128 (1994)
[hereinafter SPS Agreement]. Of course, it is often difficult to distinguish between bona fide
regulation and covert protectionism. For an attempt to devise a procedure-oriented test, see
McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21, at 572-89.
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To understand how the retaliation remedy promotes compliance
with WTO obligations, one must appreciate why nations adopt
protectionist measures in the first place. The reason is not immediately
apparent. As economists since Ricardo have recognized, protectionist
measures retard nations' economic growth.32 The theory of comparative
advantage explains why this is so. 33  Nations have different
endowments-natural resources, technology base, human capital, and
other factors-that make it easier for them to produce some goods and
services rather than others.34 Nations prosper when they specialize in
those goods and services they can produce comparatively efficiently-
those goods and services with respect to which they have a comparative
advantage-and import the rest.35 Removing trade restrictions is thus a
key to national economic success, as numerous examples since the
Second World War demonstrate.36
Why, then, would a nation adopt a protectionist measure? The
answer lies in interest group theory. While free trade benefits a national
economy as a whole, certain groups within the economy suffer, namely,
owners and workers in industries with respect to which the nation lacks a
comparative advantage.37 These groups lose out because of import
competition, and they have strong incentives to lobby the government
for measures that will protect them-high tariffs, import quotas, and the
like.38 Indeed, because their memberships are typically small and easy to
organize, and because the stakes for them are so high, these groups are
often very effective lobbyists, able to donate significantly large amounts
of time and money to support their advocates in government.
39
Of course, the majority of citizens stand to gain from free trade, and
one might expect its wishes to prevail in a democratic society. But
32. See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE
91-93 (1996) (discussing Ricardo and his contemporaries).
33. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 7-14 (discussing theory of comparative advantage).
34. Seeid. at 12-13.
35. See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 658, 662-63 (1996); see
generally PETER H. LtNDERT & THOMAS A. PUGEL, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 27-56 (10th ed.
1996).
36. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21, at 521; see also Nichols, supra note 35, at
663-64. "Trade also accelerates diffusion of knowledge and technical innovation, thus accelerating
the pace of the world's technological growth." Id. at 667.
37. See LINDERT & PUGEL, supra note 35, at 57-69.
38. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21, at 522-23.
39. See id. at 523; Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 37-39 (1991) (showing how "small groups with concentrated
(high per capita) interests in lawmaking" can overcome collective action problems more readily
than large groups).
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citizens as a whole lack the motivations for political activity that spur
protectionist interest groups.4 ° While imports can create great cost
savings for consumers in the aggregate, the effect on individual
consumers is relatively small.4' Consumers thus have relatively little
incentive to monitor trade policy and reward politicians who support free
trade.42 Moreover, consumers are too large in number to be easily
organized into a coherent pressure group. 43 As a result, protectionist
groups are often able to secure trade restrictions even though they work
to the detriment of society as a whole.4 4
The WTO's enforcement mechanism creates incentives for
domestic groups to resist these protectionist pressures, thereby
promoting a nation's compliance with its free trade obligations. The
mechanism works as follows. 45 When a dispute settlement panel
concludes that a member has adopted a measure inconsistent with WTO
rules, it generally issues a report that explains its findings and
"recommend[s]" that the member "bring the measure into conformity
with" WTO requirements.46 The member may appeal the panel's ruling
to the Appellate Body, which has authority to "uphold, modify or
reverse" the panel's decision.47 A final report of either a panel or the
40. See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 140.
41. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21, at 523-24; see also Goldstein, supra note 22,
at 139. Of course, imports can create significant cost savings for some industries, namely, those
industries that use the imports as inputs in the manufacturing process. See JACKSON ET AL., supra
note 30, at 36. As a result, those industries may well have incentives to lobby against restrictions on
those imports. I speak in the text of the mass of undifferentiated consumers. For a discussion of why
import-sensitive industries often do not lobby as effectively as protectionist groups, see McGinnis &
Movsesian, supra note 21, at 524 n.64.
42. Cf John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional
Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 379 (1999) ("[G]roups with a large number of members,
such as consumers... each of whom is affected only slightly by legislation, will form effective
political organizations only with great difficulty.").
43. See id.
44. Cf Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored
Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GA TT System, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 27, 28
(1996) (explaining that a nation may adopt bad trade policies because "the domestic political
process assigns disproportionate weight to the interests of domestic producers as compared to those
of individual domestic consumers").
45. For a more detailed description of the enforcement mechanism, see generally PALMETER
& MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 153-73.
46. DSU, supra note 2, at art. 19.1. The DSU provides that the panel and the Appellate Body
"may suggest" specific "ways in which the Member concerned could implement the
recommendations." Id. Reports generally do not include such "suggestions," however. As Hudec
explains, WTO members and WTO bureaucrats alike prefer less precise recommendations, which
allow more discretion for governments and whose ambiguity may disguise the WTO's inability to
implement its rulings. Hudec, supra note 22, at 381-82.
47. DSU, supra note 2, at art. 17.13.
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Appellate Body goes to the WTO membership-constituted, for these
purposes, as the "Dispute Settlement Body" ("DSB")-for adoption.48
Adoption occurs according to a "reverse consensus" rule: adoption
occurs automatically, unless the membership decides by consensus to
reject the report.49
The DSU allows the offending member a "reasonable period of
time" to comply with an adopted report.50 If the parties themselves
cannot agree on a time limit, the deadline is set by arbitration.5 1 The
DSU suggests a limit of 15 months from the date of a report's adoption,
but the arbitrator may set a shorter or longer period as circumstances
warrant.52 If the offending member fails to comply with the ruling within
the time allowed, the complaining member is entitled to seek remedial
relief.5
3
Remedies in the WTO are entirely prospective: they aim not to
punish the offending member for past misdeeds, but rather to readjust
trade relations so that the complaining member will not suffer loss in the
future.54 Two remedies are available. The first is "compensation,"
defined, not as the payment of money, but as the dismantling of trade
48. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 16-17 (discussing composition of DSB);
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 60 (2d
ed. 1999) (same).
49. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 16.4, art. 17.14; Green, supra note 4, at 84-85 (discussing
"reverse consensus" rule). "Consensus" exists for these purposes "if no Member, present at the
meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision." DSU,
supra note 2, at art. 2.4 n. 1. A panel report is to be adopted within 60 days of its circulation to the
DSB; an Appellate Body report, within 30 days. See id. at art. 16.4, art. 17.14.
The reverse consensus rule is a marked change from the old GATT practice, under which
a panel report was adopted only if there was a consensus in favor. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 30, at
263-64. For more on the old consensus requirement, and the criticisms that surrounded it, see
Movsesian, supra note 1, at 784-85.
50. DSU, supra note 2, at art. 21.3. For an argument that the "reasonable period of time" can
provide a grace period for non-compliance, see Gleason & Walther, supra note 12, at 720-21.
51. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 21.3(c).
52. See id.; PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 157. Some early cases suggested that
arbitrators would grant a 15-month period as a matter of course, but more recent decisions have
specified shorter time limits. See Hudec, supra note 22, at 394; Gleason & Walther, supra note 12,
at 715-18.
53. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22.1, art. 22.2; see PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2,
at 167. If the parties disagree about whether the offending member has implemented the report,
there is another round of litigation, this time to assess the adequacy of compliance with the earlier
ruling. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 21.5; PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 165-66. If
possible, the matter is heard by the same panel that heard the original dispute; the panel must issue a
report on compliance within 90 days. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 21.5. If the panel cannot
complete a report within 90 days, it must inform the DSB of the reasons for the delay and the
estimated date of completion. See id.
54. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 167; Hudec, supra note 22, at 382-86.
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barriers by the offending member. 55 If the parties cannot reach
agreement on "satisfactory" compensation within 20 days, the
complaining member may request authorization for the second possible
remedy: retaliation. 6
Retaliation consists of the "suspension of concessions or other
obligations" by the complaining member-that is, the erection of trade
barriers against the products of the offending member.57 Retaliation must
be "equivalent" to the loss the offending member's measure has caused
the complaining member,58 and should relate to the same economic
sector: goods, services, and so on.59 If the offending member objects to
the proposed level of retaliation, or to the proposed sector, the matter
goes to arbitration.60 The DSB grants authorization to retaliate, on the
basis of the arbitral report, according to the same reverse consensus rule
that governs the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports.6 1
55. See Pauwelyn, supra note 13, at 337; see also PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at
167. The DSU provides that compensation "shall be consistent with" the requirements of WTO
agreements. DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22.1. One of the most important of these is the non-
discrimination requirement, and it is understood that the compensatory lifting of trade barriers must
apply with respect to the products of all WTO members. See Pauwelyn, supra note 13, at 337 n. 12;
see also PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 167.
56. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22.2; see also Pauwelyn, supra note 13, at 337 & n.14
(characterizing suspension of concessions or other obligations as retaliation).
57. DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22.1; see Pauwelyn, supra note 13, at 337.
58. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22.4.
59. See id. at art. 22.3; PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 169-70.
60. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22.6, art. 22.7. If possible, the panel that heard the original
case will conduct the arbitration; its report must issue within sixty days after the expiration of the
"reasonable period of time" set for compliance. See id. at art. 22.6.
The sixty-day limit prescribed by article 22.6 creates a potential conflict with another
DSU provision, article 21.5, which allows ninety days to adjudicate the sufficiency of compliance.
What if the ninety-day period to adjudicate compliance has not min by the end of the "reasonable
period of time?" Allowing arbitration to proceed under article 22.6 might result in the imposition of
countermeasures before the question of compliance has been fully determined. See Hudec, supra
note 22, at 395. The inconsistency between articles 22.6 and 21.5 has been managed on an ad hoc
basis, but there are calls for a definitive resolution. See id. at 395-96. For more on this problem, see
Gleason & Walther, supra note 12, at 721-26, 729-30.
61. See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22.7; JACKSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 266-67; Green,
supra note 4, at 85-86. For more on the reverse consensus rule, see supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
The level of retaliation is set on a yearly basis, that is, X amount of retaliation per year.
See, e.g., European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)--
Original Complaint By the United States-Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities
Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999) 84 (awarding United States a
maximum amount of roughly US$ 117 million per year). Hudec observes that, with respect to the
equivalency question, arbitration has been "almost perfunctory": panels "have listened to all the
information and to all the various theories of measurement.., but in the end have rendered"
decisions that fail to explain the "underlying calculations in detail." Hudec, supra note 22, at 390.
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One can readily see how this enforcement mechanism, and the
retaliation remedy in particular, works to promote compliance with
WTO obligations. As I have shown, nations adopt protectionist measures
in order to satisfy the demands of interest groups that exert
disproportionate influence in domestic politics. 62 The retaliation remedy
alters the balance of power by creating incentives for another domestic
group-exporters-to counteract the influence of protectionist groups
and lobby for the removal of the offending measure.63 The retaliation
remedy thus encourages compliance indirectly, creating pressure for
trade liberalization in the offending country without intruding overtly on
domestic political actors.
Retaliation imposes costs on exporters in the offending country by
denying them sales in the complaining country.64 These costs create
incentives for the exporters to put pressure on their government to
remove the protectionist measure that led to the retaliation. Indeed, the
complaining member can be expected to raise trade barriers in a way that
targets precisely those exporters who are most likely to make their pain
known to elected officials.65
The length of the enforcement process-an aspect that some critics
have decried-may itself be useful in motivating exporters in the
offending country. 66 As Hudec has observed, "the effects of retaliation
are generated in several successive stages., 67 Typically, the complaining
country announces a long list of potential targets, which becomes
progressively narrower as the process moves through arbitration.68 Even
62. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
63. See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 144-45; Hudec, supra note 22, at 388; see also Nzelibe,
supra note 22, at II.A.
64. See Murray, supra note 22, at 262-63, 270 (discussing effect of retaliatory tariff that
United States imposed on European products in context of Hormones dispute).
The exporters may bear a second cost as well. Murray argues that the loss of access to the
complaining country's market may well create a supply surplus in the exporters' other markets,
including the exporters' own home market. See id. at 262-63, 270. According to Murray, this
surplus will create downward pressure on the exporters' prices: quite simply, the exporters will be
"stuck with.., extra goods," and will have to sell them for less. Id. at 263; see also Jas Kaminski,
Irish Exporters Manage So Far to Avoid Impact of US Trade Tariffs, IRISH TIMES, July 31, 1999, at
Bus. & Fin. 17 (explaining how Irish exporters fear this effect of American retaliatory tariffs). Of
course, the retaliation may draw goods from third-country markets to the complaining country,
thereby making room for the offending country's products and negating the effect Murray
envisions.
65. See Murray, supra note 22, at 268.
66. For criticisms of the length of the enforcement process, see, for example, Clough, supra
note 11, at 270-71, and Gleason & Walther, supra note 12, at 712, 731-35.
67. Hudec, supra note 22, at 388 n.34.
68. See id.; see also Chamovitz, supra note 16, at 814.
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for those exporters who are eventually removed from the list, the threat
of retaliation may provide enough incentive to lobby the government for
removal of the offending measure: 69 better to pressure the government at
an early stage than wait for the axe to fall. Indeed, the desire to create
free-floating anxiety about retaliation seems to be the purpose behind the
"carousel" provision of United States law, which generally requires
USTR to revise the list of targets for retaliation every six months. 70
To be sure, retaliation also imposes costs on the retaliating country
itself.7' By raising barriers to foreign competition, the retaliating country
denies its consumers access to cheaper, higher-quality imports and
interferes with the efficient distribution of resources that the theory of
comparative advantage envisions." But these criticisms miss an
important point. Retaliation in a trade dispute is not so much an
economic strategy as a political one.73 The goal is not to make the
complaining country "whole" in an economic sense, but rather to spur
the target country to adopt free trade policies that ultimately will benefit
74the citizens of both countries. In this way, retaliation can serve a
beneficial purpose, even if it does impose short-term economic loss.
75
Even if one accepts these claims in favor of the retaliation remedy,
one might question whether a formal authorization adds anything.
Retaliation would be available as a strategy without a third-party
process: 76 even without the approval of a supranational organization, a
nation could target a foreign country's exporters in the hope of
69. See Hudec, supra note 22, at 388 n.34; see also Martin Crutsinger, US Issues TariffList in
Battle With Europe, HOUSTON CHRON., April 10, 1999, at 3 (discussing European complaint that
"mere publication" of proposed targets has a "chilling effect" on firms' ability to sell in American
markets).
70. Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 407, 114 Stat. 293; see also
Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 839, 950-51 (2000) (discussing carousel
provision); Helene Cooper, Food Fight With Europe May Worsen, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2000, at
A2; Robert O'Neill, Making a List, Checking It Twice, 32 NAT'L J. 2505 (2000).
71. See, e.g., Chamovitz, supra note 16, at 814-15; Palmeter, supra note 1, at 472; Young,
supra note 13, at 408.
72. See Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 814-15.
73. See Hudec, supra note 22, at 388.
74. See id.
75. Adam Smith himself recognized this justification for retaliation in a trade dispute:
There may be good policy in retaliations of this kind, when there is a probability that
they will procure the repeal of the high duties or prohibitions complained of. The
recovery of a great foreign market will generally more than compensate the transitory
inconveniency of paying dearer during a short time for some sorts of goods.
I ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 490 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976).
76. See Green, supra note 4, at 108-10 (discussing this scenario).
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pressuring that country to change its trade policy.77 The DSU's
mechanism for authorizing retaliation offers two important advantages
over the self-help model, however. First, the requirements that retaliation
be equivalent to the complaining member's loss, and that retaliation
relate to the same economic sector as the original violation, serve as
checks against excessive and indiscriminate reprisals.78 Such checks are
necessary: protectionist groups in the complaining nation would like
nothing better than to raise barriers to foreign competition, and likely
would view "remedial" retaliation as an opportunity to inflict costs far
beyond the injury underlying the original dispute.79
Excessive retaliation would create serious problems. As I explained
earlier, retaliation imposes costs on the complaining nation itself; the
higher the level of retaliation, the greater those costs will be. More
fundamentally, disproportionate retaliation might cause a popular
backlash in the target country. 80 If citizens were to view the complaining
country's retaliation as extravagant or unfair, they might grow resentful
and decline to encourage their government to resolve the dispute.81
Indeed, protectionist groups could turn popular resentment to their
advantage by arguing for a "patriotic" resistance to the foreign demand
for removal of the offending measure. 2
To be sure, distinguishing between "excessive" and "equivalent"
retaliation can be difficult in the context of a particular dispute. Like
GATT panelists before them, WTO arbitrators have tended to announce
conclusions about permissible levels of retaliation without providing
detailed explanations. 83 But precise calculations are not all that
important. What matters is that the WTO appear as a credible check on
77. For example, since 1974, "section 301" has given the United States government the
authority to retaliate against foreign unfair trade practices. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (2002); see
generally THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN
U.S. TRADE POLICY (1994) (discussing United States practice under section 301). Indeed, a desire
to curb United States unilateralism was a prime motivator in the adoption of the DSU. See United
States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (WT/DS 152/R) 1 7.2 (Jan. 27, 2000) (discussing
EC's characterization of the "historical deal... between the US and the other Uruguay Round
participants").
78. See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and
Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL. STUD. S 179, S204 (2002) (WTO
procedure a response to "the danger of excessive unilateral sanctions that exists in the absence of
centralized oversight regarding the magnitude of sanctions").
79. See Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 815-16.
80. See Hudec, supra note 22, at 389-90.
81. See id.
82. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21, at 524-25 (explaining that protectionist
groups can exploit nationalist sentiment).
83. See Hudec, supra note 22, at 390-91.
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overreaching by the injured party: in Hudec's words, that the arbitrators'
decision "look[] objective enough to persuade the relevant audiences...
that a neutral tribunal [has] made an objective judgment of
equivalence. 84 Indeed, the mere fact that arbitrators have cut back on a
request for authorization to retaliate may go a long way toward
reassuring citizens in the target country.
This observation highlights the second advantage of the WTO's
mechanism. Formal authorization lends retaliation a legitimacy that self-
help measures lack.85 A country that retaliates unilaterally in a trade
dispute runs the risk of appearing high-handed, especially if its economy
is much larger than that of the target country. 86 A perception of
arrogance could easily wreck a retaliation strategy for the reasons just
discussed: citizens of the target country might grow resentful and
resistant to free trade reform. Retaliation that comes at the end of a long
third-party process, by contrast, seems less like bullying and more the
result of neutral principles fairly applied.87 As a result, it would be less
likely to cause offense than unilateral retaliation, and less likely to
backfire on the complaining nation.
To see how the retaliation remedy has worked in practice, consider
the two disputes to date in which prevailing parties have resorted to it.
88
The first is Bananas. In 1997, in response to a complaint from the
United States, the DSB ruled that European restrictions on the
importation of bananas violated various WTO requirements. 89 The DSB
allowed the EC a reasonable period of time to comply with the ruling by
amending its laws; when the EC failed to do so, the United States
84. Id. at 391 (discussing arbitrators' decision in Bananas).
85. See Green, supra note 4, at 110.
86. Seeid. atll0-11.
87. See id.; see also Hudec, supra note 22, at 390 (arguing that "[t]o avoid such perceptions
[of unfairness], the important thing is not the fact of equivalence itself, but rather having some
credible mechanism which can certify equivalence in a politically persuasive way").
88. The DSB has authorized retaliation in seven disputes, see Update, supra note 8, at ii, a
number that already exceeds the total number of authorizations granted under the old GATT regime.
See Movsesian, supra note 1, at 785 n.64. In only two, Bananas and Hormones, has the prevailing
party acted on the authorization. Earlier this year, the WTO authorized the EC to retaliate against
the United States, in the amount of roughly $4 billion per year, in a dispute involving American
business entities known as foreign sales corporations. See Update, supra note 9, at 141; see also
United States-Tax Treatment For "Foreign Sales Corporations," Decision of the Arbitrator,
WT/DS 108/ARB, at 8.1 (Aug. 30, 2002). The EC has not yet acted on the authorization.
89. See Timothy M. Reif & Marjorie Florestal, Revenge of the Push-Me, Pull-You: The
Implementation Process Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 32 INT'L LAW. 755,
776-77 (1998). For the Appellate Body report that the DSU adopted in Bananas, see European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc.
WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
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requested authorization to retaliate by raising tariffs on European
products in the amount of $520 million per year.90 The EC objected to
this request and the matter went to arbitration.91 The arbitral panel pared
down the level of retaliation to approximately $191 million per year, and
in April 1999 the DSB authorized the United States to raise tariffs to that
extent.92 The United States responded by imposing 100% tariffs on a
variety of European products. 93
The United States sanctions caused a great deal of consternation
among targeted European exporters.94 The exporters' complaints became
particularly urgent when, in May 2000, the United States announced
plans to rotate the list of targeted products every six months in
accordance with a newly enacted "carousel" provision.95 It is difficult to
calculate precisely the impact that the exporters' complaints had on EC
officials. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to believe that pressure from
affected exporters, particularly in light of the uncertainty generated by
the threatened use of the carousel provision, was an important factor in
getting the EC to settle its dispute with the United States. 96 In return for
90. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas-Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB 1.1 (April 9, 1999) [hereinafter Bananas Arbitrators Report]; see also
Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 795.
91. See Bananas Arbitrators Report, supra note 90, at 1.1.
92. See id at 8.1; see also WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Annual Report (2001),
Addendum: Overview of the State of Play of WTO Disputes, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/26/Add. 1 at 64
(Oct. 12, 2001); John H. Jackson & Patricio Grane, The Saga Continues: An Update on the Banana
Dispute and Its Procedural Offspring, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 581, 593 (2001).
93. See Bhala, supra note 70, at 944. The United States was not the only country that sought
authorization to retaliate in Bananas. In November 1999, Ecuador requested authorization to
retaliate against the EC in the amount of US$ 450 million per year. See European Communities-
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB/ECU I (Mar.
24, 2000). The arbitrators authorized Ecuador to retaliate in the amount of approximately US$
202 million per year. See id at 173(a). The DSB approved, see Jackson & Grane, supra note 92, at
594, but in the end Ecuador did not retaliate. See Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 795.
94. See, e.g., William Chisholm, Cashmere Industry Threatens EC Over US Sanctions Fear,
SCOTSMAN, Sept. 1, 2000, at 4 (noting "intensive efforts" by Scottish cashmere industry "to force
Europe" to end the bananas dispute); Tina Dawson, Joy Over Cashmere: Truce in U.S. 'Banana
Wars' Will Save Ailing Scots Clothing Industry, DAILY MAIL, April 12, 2001, at 45 (alluding to
"'[t]wo years of intense lobbying in Brussels, London and Washington' on behalf of affected
Scottish cashmere producers).
95. See, e.g., Chisholm, supra note 94 (discussing threats by Scottish cashmere firms to sue
EC for compensation in bananas dispute); Torcuil Crichton, A Future Hanging by a Thread,
SUNDAY HERALD (Scotland), Sept. 3, 2000, at 6 (discussing Scottish firms' lobbying efforts in
Brussels "for a resolution of the dispute" in light of carousel provision).
96. Although the United States did not actually implement the carousel measure, see Daniel
Wuger, The Never Ending Story: The Implementation Phase in the Dispute Between the EC and the
United States on Hormone-Treated Beef 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 777, 807 (2002), "the threat
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the EC's promise to amend its import restrictions on bananas, the United
States dropped its retaliatory tariffs in July 2001 .
Bananas illustrates the effectiveness of the retaliation remedy in
fostering change in a target country. Hormones, by contrast, shows that
retaliation may not always be so successful. Like Bananas, Hormones
involved a complaint by the United States against the EC, this time in
connection with the EC's ban on the importation of American meat that
had been treated with growth hormones.98 In 1998, the DSB ruled that
the EC's ban violated WTO rules and gave the EC a reasonable period
of time to comply by amending its laws. Again the EC failed to do so,
and again the United States requested authorization to retaliate, this time
in the amount of $202 million per year.99 When the EC objected to this
level, an arbitral panel reduced it to about $117 million per year. 00 In
July 1999, the DSB authorized retaliation in that amount; the United
States responded by imposing 100% tariffs on various European
products.101
Just as in Bananas, the new American tariff levels have occasioned
complaints from European exporters.' 0 2 On this occasion, however, the
complaints have not succeeded in effecting a change in European
policy. 0 3 Four years later, the ban on hormone-treated meat remains in
place. There are no indications that the EC will lift it anytime soon.'1
4
of carousel rotation was probably a factor in getting the U.S. and EC administrations to reach a
settlement in Bananas." Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 797.
97. Martin Crutsinger, U.S. Eases Trade Duties As Banana Export Tussle Ends, CHI. TRIB.
July 2, 2001, at N3.
98. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21, at 599.
99. See European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones)-Original Complaint by the United States-Recourse to Arbitration by the European
Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU-Decision of the Arbitrator, WT/DS26/ARB 1 (July
12, 1999).
100. Seeid at 83-84.
101. See Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 796. In the same dispute, an arbitral panel authorized
Canada to retaliate against the EC in the amount of approximately C$ I I million per year. European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)--Original Complaint
by Canada-Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WT/DS48/ARB 72-73 (July 12, 1999). Like the United States, Canada has acted on this
authorization by imposing 100% tariffs on various European products. See Chamovitz, supra note
16, at 796.
102. See, e.g., David Pearson, Mustard Makers Are Heated Up Over Tariffs, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Aug. 13, 2001, at 18.
103. See Michael M. Weinstein & Steve Chamovitz, The Greening of the WTO, 80 FOREIGN
AFF. 147, 150 (2001) (noting that American trade sanctions "have not forced the Europeans to back
down" in Hormones).
104. See Wuger, supra note 96, at 809 (noting that the EC has "never considered withdrawing
its ban on hormone-treated beef imports. Rather, it tends to further reinforce its measures.").
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Critics have pointed to Hormones as an example of the
ineffectiveness of the WTO's enforcement mechanism.' 0 5 While the
criticisms have some merit-retaliation obviously has failed to occasion
compliance by the EC-they miss a larger point. Retaliation has failed to
secure compliance in Hormones because of the strong popular support in
Europe for the ban on hormone-treated meat. 0 6 As the Appellate Body
ruling in the case pointed out, European consumers have widespread and
genuine concerns about the safety of such meat. 10 7 Pressure from
exporters who suffer from American tariffs is simply not enough to
overcome the effect of these concerns in the democratic process.
European regulators who attempt to lift the ban likely would suffer
serious political punishment.1
0 8
Hormones thus demonstrates a practical flexibility that will serve as
a long-run advantage for the WTO's enforcement regime. Where, as in
Hormones, there is strong popular support for an import restriction, a
nation can keep the restriction in place-as long as the nation is willing
to pay a price in terms of foregone export opportunities.'0 9 A more
rigorous enforcement mechanism, one that purported to compel a nation
to repeal a measure with substantial popular support, would only create a
crippling backlash against the WTO."10 Indeed, a nation's capacity to
retain an import restriction that has substantial popular support can serve
as a useful check against the potential for overreaching by the DSB-a
matter to which I will turn shortly.
The flexibility of the retaliation remedy also makes it superior to an
alternative enforcement mechanism: direct effect."' Under a direct
effect regime, DSB rulings would bind domestic courts automatically,
without further action by national authorities.". 12 If the DSB were to rule
105. See, e.g., Gleason & Walther, supra note 12, at 728; Weinstein & Chamovitz, supra note
103.
106. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 64.
107. See WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R 245 (Jan. 16, 1998).
108. See Chamovitz, supra note 16, at 820; Wuger, supra note 96, at 809.
109. See Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 820.
110. See J. Patrick Kelly, The WTO and Global Governance: The Case For Contractual Treaty
Regimes, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 109, 134-35 (2001) (explaining that international enforcement
mechanisms that impose norms on countries would create backlash); cf Nichols, supra note 35, at
659 (noting danger that rigid dispute settlement system might "actually hinder the prospects for free
trade").
11. For sources on direct effect regimes, see supra note 15.
112. See James McCall Smith, The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism
in Regional Trade Pacts, 54 INT'L ORG. 137, 141-42 (2000); see also Chamovitz, supra note 16, at
824-25 (discussing use of term "direct effect"). Commentators sometimes draw a distinction
between direct effect and the supremacy of DSB rulings. See, e.g., Cottier & Schefer, supra note 15,
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that a national measure violated WTO requirements, national courts
could no longer apply the measure as a rule of decision. If national
authorities tried to invoke the measure against private parties, national
courts would deny enforcement." 13 Indeed, private parties themselves
might rely on the DSB's ruling as the basis for an action against the
state.' 4
One might view direct effect as having two principal advantages
over the present regime. First, by enlisting national courts, direct effect
might better promote compliance with WTO requirements, particularly
by powerful countries that might otherwise ignore DSB rulings. For
example, commentators argue that the retaliation remedy is of relatively
little use in the context of a complaint by a developing country against a
developed country." 5 Because retaliation is limited to the extent of the
complaining member's loss, the remedy provides little incentive for the
developed country to change its ways: the impact of retaliation by the
developing country is likely to be minuscule in relation to the developed
country's larger economy.' 16 Under a direct effect regime, by contrast,
the "option to breach" would not exist,1 17 and developed countries might
be more likely to honor their WTO obligations.
Second, direct effect might give quicker relief to private firms-by
some accounts, the primary beneficiaries of the WTO system.1 8 For
example, consider the plight that the present regime creates for an
importer whose government has adopted a protectionist measure. Even if
the DSB rules that the measure is invalid, the firm must wait to see
whether retaliation by the complaining member eventually convinces the
at 100-01. That is, one could envision a regime in which WTO obligations were self-executing in
national courts, but national courts were free to reject the DSB's rulings on the nature of those
obligations. Cf Jackson, supra note 15, at 326-27 (describing this scenario in the context of
international institutions generally). I do not draw that distinction here: I use direct effect to mean a
regime in which a DSB ruling automatically binds a domestic court, without implementation of the
DSB's ruling by national authorities.
113. See Cottier & Schefer, supra note 15, at 91 (describing direct effect as regime in which "a
private person in a state... may base a claim in, and be granted relief from, the domestic courts of
that state against another private person or the state on the basis of the state's obligations under an
international treaty").
114. See Ruttley, The Effect of WTO Agreements, supra note 15, at 130-3 1; Smith, supra note
112, at 142; see also Abbott, supra note 15, at 158, 171-72, 184 (discussing how, under direct effect
regime, private parties would be able to vindicate rights in national court systems).
115. See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 13, at 338; Young, supra note 13, at 408.
116. See, e.g., Palmeter, supra note 1, at 473.
117. Jackson, supra note 15, at 325 (discussing direct effect in international law generally).
118. See Ruttley, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 12, at 169; Ruttley, The Effect of WTO
Agreements, supra note 15, at 130, 155; cf Cottier & Schefer, supra note 15, at 111 (stating that
"[flrom an... individual rights' point of view, it is difficult to sustain the denial of direct effect").
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government to repeal the measure. This may take a considerable period
of time, during which the import restriction will continue to impose a
loss on the firm."19 Under a direct effect regime, by contrast, the firm
could immediately bring an action in a domestic court for an injunction
to prevent the measure's enforcement.
So far, WTO members have resisted calls to move to direct
effect. 120 In part, this resistance can be explained by the limited nature of
the political commitment that members, particularly developed
countries, have made to the organization. 12 1 Notwithstanding their
formal agreement to an enhanced enforcement mechanism, members
have remained quite wary of granting the WTO too much authority over
their decisions. 122 Given this wariness, members' refusal to grant DSB
rulings direct effect should come as no surprise.'
23
But more than mere truculence explains the unwillingness to adopt
a direct effect mechanism. Members are right to reject direct effect.
Direct effect would take the advantages of the retaliation mechanism and
precisely invert them. For example, where retaliation works indirectly,
creating incentives for exporters without intruding expressly on the
prerogatives of national institutions, direct effect would commandeer
domestic courts and make them subalterns of the DSB. Instead of
counteracting the influence of protectionist groups, direct effect would
empower them with a "patriotic" argument. 124 Just as in the case of
119. For a similar example focusing on an exporting firm, see Ruttley, WTO Dispute
Settlement, supra note 12, at 180-8 1.
120. See Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 825. For example, the ECJ has indicated that WTO
obligations do not have direct effect in the European Communities. Ruttley, WTO Dispute
Settlement, supra note 12, at 188. In the United States, the matter is settled by section 102 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which firmly denies effect to any DSB ruling that is inconsistent
with existing United States law. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2) (2002). On the absence of direct effect
in international dispute settlement generally, see Smith, supra note 112, at 142.
121. See Hudec, supra note 22, at 372-76.
122. See id.; see also Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 11-14 (1999). As Hudec describes
it, members agreed to an enhanced enforcement mechanism in the Uruguay Round as a means of
blunting a resurgent American unilateralism in trade matters. See Hudec, supra note 22, at 373-74.
Members' "basic political attitudes" about the undesirability of central control over their decisions
"had not changed," however. Id. at 375. As Hudec writes, "[a]n agreement adopted with this much
reluctance will almost certainly encounter a bias against making its enforcement pressures
stronger." Id. at 376.
123. See Carlos M. Vazquez & John H. Jackson, Some Reflections on Compliance With WTO
Dispute Settlement Decisions, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 555, 565 (2002) (members "were
unwilling to pay the collateral costs in terms of sovereignty for a regime that would achieve
[perfect] compliance").
124. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21, at 524-25 (explaining that protectionist
groups can exploit nationalist sentiment).
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excessive retaliation, it would be easy for protectionist groups to
characterize direct effect as an affront to national sovereignty, and to
rally resistance to the assertion of supremacy by the WTO.1
25
Moreover, where the retaliation remedy allows a nation to retain a
trade restriction that has substantial popular support (as in Hormones), a
direct effect mechanism would not. Once the DSB had ruled that the
restriction violates WTO requirements, domestic courts theoretically
would be powerless to enforce it. 126 Again, an assertion of supremacy in
these circumstances would create a public backlash that would make it
difficult for government officials to dismantle the restriction. Indeed, the
public response might cause a member to retreat from WTO obligations
generally.
127
Thus, despite the claims of its proponents, direct effect would
promote disdain for the WTO and make it more difficult for groups that
benefit from free trade to obtain relief. In addition, in eliminating the
option to breach, a direct effect regime would remove an important
check against the long-term potential for overreaching by the WTO.1
28
While the WTO at present poses little threat to representative democracy
in member states, the organization may seek to expand its powers in the
future. 129 Indeed, a number of commentators and politicians are urging
the WTO to take a more active role in setting global policies on the
environment, labor relations, and other regulatory matters. 130  Some
recent DSB rulings suggest that the organization is willing to do so.' 3'
125. See Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90
Am. J. INT'L L. 416, 416 (1996) (showing how protectionists have made sovereignty arguments to
resist WTO dispute settlement); see also Hudec, supra note 22, at 389-90 (describing effects of
excessive retaliation).
126. See Smith, supra note 112, at 141-42.
127. See Cottier & Schefer, supra note 15, at 112 (explaining that assertion of direct effect
"might spur a formal or, more likely, informal retreat from WTO membership"); cf Nichols, supra
note 35, at 660 (explaining how "intemperance" of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism might
eventually "hinder the ability of member countries to support the" organization).
128. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21, at 569; see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note
30, at 223 (absence of direct effect for DSB rulings "'can be an important constraint if matters go
seriously wrong') (quoting testimony of John H. Jackson before the Senate Finance Committee).
129. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 114 (explaining that WTO at present "is not an
unaccountable body," but "a contractual regime controlled by states and thus responsive to
individual states' political agendas"); Padideh Ala'i, A Human Rights Critique of the WTO: Some
Preliminary Observations, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 537, 537 (2001) (noting "distrust
engendered by the inevitable expansion of the WTO trade mandate into areas such as labor, the
environment, and human rights").
130. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 111; McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21, at 550-52.
131. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21, at 519. But cf Davey, supra note 1, at 96
(arguing that panel and Appellate Body rulings do not suggest "overreaching... so as to... limit
inappropriately the discretion of Member government policy-making"). For an argument that WTO
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Granting the WTO more authority over the substance of national
regulatory policy would pose a threat to representative democracy.
Regulatory policy requires a sensitive balancing of a variety of factors.
Environmental regulation, for example, often involves consideration of
local ecological conditions, industrial practices, economic realities, and
social norms. 132 Labor rules may implicate traditional cultural usages
and expectations about the nature of work. 133 Representative democracy
requires that decisions about such matters be made by actors that are
accountable to the public. 134 In this way, the decisions acquire a
legitimacy that makes them worthy of respect. 
135
To be sure, national policies do not always reflect the public
interest; indeed, that is a central premise of this Essay. But national
governments are far more accountable than the WTO.1 36 Unlike WTO
staffers, national officials must stand for popular election at least once in
a while. 137 They are thus both more familiar and accessible to the
average citizen than policymakers at the WTO. 138 Moreover, national
institutions typically have organic connections to the polity-links of
shared history and culture-that the WTO utterly lacks.1 39 As a result,
regulations that national bodies adopt are much more likely to reflect
local tastes, traditions and realities than any rules the WTO would
formulate. 140
tribunals will play a role in an inevitable shift of regulatory power to a global regime, see Charles H.
Koch, Jr., Judicial Review and Global Federalism, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 491,492, 500, 510 (2002).
132. See Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop Grewell, It Isn't Easy Being Green: Environmental
Policy Implications For Foreign Policy, International Law, and Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 427,
440 (2001) (explaining how "international environmental regulation suffers from a lack of...
information" about local conditions); Kelly, supra note 110, at 120; Nichols, supra note 35, at 673-
79 (discussing ways in which national environmental regulations reflect societal values).
133. See Nichols, supra note 35, at 683-85 (discussing ways in which national labor
regulations reflect societal values).
134. See John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of
Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2218, 2240 (1999) ("As a matter of accountability, when
the government imposes rules of conduct on individuals, those rules ought to be made by members
of the legislature who directly represent the people.").
135. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 134.
136. See Ku, supra note 24, at 121 (discussing relative unaccountability of international
organizations); see also id. at 125 (discussing unaccountability of WTO dispute settlement panels).
137. Seeid.at 121.
138. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21, at 566-67.
139. See Movsesian, supra note 1, at 816-17; see also Ku, supra note 24, at 77, 126-29
(discussing how lack of historical mythos creates a legitimacy deficit for international
organizations); Nichols, supra note 35, at 671-72 (discussing arguments that law derives legitimacy
from congruence with societal values).
140. See Anderson & Grewell, supra note 132, at 440; McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 21,
at 567.
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Thus, a direct effect regime, one in which the decisions of relatively
unaccountable trade bureaucrats would automatically preempt those of
relatively accountable national institutions, might eventually pose a real
threat to representative government. 141 Once one appreciates this threat,
the option to breach begins to look like a democratic safeguard, a means
of ensuring that representative national bodies have the final say on
whether and how to respond to the rulings of a supranational
institution. 142 At the moment, as I say, the prospect of an effective power
grab by the WTO seems remote. If members ever do grant the WTO
substantive regulatory authority, however, the option to breach will be
an important safeguard indeed. 143
The comparison with direct effect shows the genius of the current
enforcement mechanism. The retaliation remedy helps solve a dilemma
at the heart of the world trade regime: how to give the WTO sufficient
power to promote global trade without conferring so much power that
the organization becomes a threat to representative democracy.
Retaliation accomplishes this task by promoting trade indirectly,
creating incentives for domestic groups to lobby against protectionist
measures while allowing national governments the ultimate say on
regulatory policy. Retaliation may not always ensure compliance; as
Hormones shows, the pressures that retaliation creates may not always
be sufficient to overcome strong public support for an offending
measure. Still, by striking a prudent balance between free trade and self-
government, the retaliation remedy makes a vital contribution to the
emerging world trade system.
141. See ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 14, 114; cf Cottier & Schefer,
supra note 15, at 97-98 (discussing argument that direct effect is "dangerous to the idea of
democracy and democratic representation of individuals").
142. As Patrick Kelly observes, "[iln order to preserve democratic legitimacy, international
regulation should be based on contractual arrangements that are at some point presented either to
domestic legislatures or to a vote of the people." Kelly, supra note 110, at 134. For more on how the
denial of direct effect can "reinforce democratic legitimacy," see Joel P. Trachtman, Bananas,
Direct Effect and Compliance, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 655, 677 (1999).
143. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 223 (absence of direct effect for DSB rulings "'can
be an important constraint if matters go seriously wrong') (quoting testimony of John H. Jackson
before the Senate Finance Committee).
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